Built entirely by AI, analyses included. Not financial advice.
Country Outlook
Latest data Oct 2026 · computed 14 Oct 2026
History: Maddison Project GDP from 1850, World Bank from 1960, IMF from 1980; consumer prices from the IMF only (official data were unreliable in 2007-15)
56%
estimated chance that an economic crisis starts within 2 years
40% of all its past years were followed by one
1 of the 4 past years that scored at least this high was followed by a crisis within 2 years.
55/100
Higher than 83% of years since 1984
Measures that published studies found often high before past crises: credit and debt growth, house and stock prices against their trend, the yield curve, interest-rate rises and external deficits. Low market volatility counts toward it.
Building up mostReal exchange rate vs trend
100
Foreign reserves
79
Private credit
72
52/100
Higher than 49% of years since 1919
How far today's readings are from Argentina's usual levels, across 49 indicators.
External
75
Global environment
67
Private credit
62
Stock market
60
Public finances
43
Inflation and policy
36
Economy
16
The build-up measures, each against Argentina's own history. Each area starts with a fixed weight, adjusted by how it read before Argentina's past crises.
Before 2 of the 4 economic crises that can be tested, the score was in the top quarter of the country's history (75th percentile or higher) in the 2 years before.
Of the 5 years it was that high outside a crisis, 4 (80%) were followed by a crisis within 2 years.
Ranking quality 69/100, where 50 is what chance would give (67 with every area weighted the same).
For comparison, the stress score ranked them 42/100.
| Crisis | Percentile before | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Inflation surge (2023) | 58 | Not high before |
| Peso crisis (2018) | 96 | High 2 years before |
| Holdout default (2014) | 85 | High 2 years before |
| Default and end of convertibility (2001) | 50 | Not high before |
How much today's readings look like the year before each crisis started.
Holdout default (2014)
39%
Peso crisis (2018)
38%
Inflation surge (2023)
36%
Default and end of convertibility (2001)
31%
Baring crisis (1890)
29%
2 of the 10 most similar past years were followed by a crisis within two years (Inflation surge (2023), Holdout default (2014)), against 15% of all years.
1943
52%
1946
46%
2021 → Inflation surge began 2023
43%
1933
41%
1951
41%
1930
41%
1953
41%
1934
41%
1954
39%
2013 → Holdout default began 2014
39%
62 indicators measured, 20 not available for Argentina.
Change in real output from a year earlier.
2.35%
Q1 2026
Lower than 62% of years since 1876
Danger up from 38 a year ago
Median 4.3% · usual range -4.16% to 11.1%
The year before past crises: median 2.82%, from -5.74% before the Debt crisis (1982) to 7.16% before the Banking crisis of 1980-82
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 8 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Tequila contagion (1995), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (10), it read higher than in other years 59% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: Maddison Project 1850–2022 · FRED NGDPRSAXDCARQ 2023–2026-01
Share of the labour force out of work.
7.4%
2025
Lower than 58% of years since 1980
Danger up from 36 a year ago
Median 7.95% · usual range 5.5% to 17.2%
The year before past crises: median 7.75%, from 5% before the Debt crisis (1982) to 17.1% before the Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 4 of 8 crises: Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Holdout default (2014), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (4), it read higher than in other years 60% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (LUR) 1980–2025
One-year change in the unemployment rate.
+0.2 pp
2025
Higher than 56% of years since 1981
Danger down from 74 a year ago
Median 0 pp · usual range -2 pp to +2 pp
The year before past crises: median +0.55 pp, from -2 pp before the Inflation surge (2023) to +2 pp before the Debt crisis (1982)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 8 crises: Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (4), it read higher than in other years 70% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (LUR) 1980–2025
Gross investment relative to GDP. Both very high and very low count as the dangerous side.
16.1% of GDP
2025
Lower than 84% of years since 1960
Danger down from 74 a year ago
Median 19.1% of GDP · usual range 15.6% of GDP to 24.9% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 18.4% of GDP, from 14.2% of GDP before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020) to 25.9% of GDP before the Banking crisis of 1980-82
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 8 of 10 crises: Rodrigazo (1975), Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (7), it read higher than in other years 48% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Both extremes are dangerous. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS) 1960–2025
Household spending after inflation, against a year earlier.
7.87%
2025
Higher than 70% of years since 1994
Danger down from 77 a year ago
Median 3.65% · usual range -5.71% to 9.47%
The year before past crises: median 3.9%, from -6.13% before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020) to 9.47% before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 6 crises: Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 40% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (NE.CON.PRVT.KD) 1993–2025
Volume of exports of goods and services against a year earlier.
7.56%
2025
Higher than 64% of years since 1961
Danger up from 9 a year ago
Median 3.95% · usual range -8.86% to 18.4%
The year before past crises: median 3.63%, from -3.52% before the Holdout default (2014) to 18.7% before the Hyperinflation (1989)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 10 crises: Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Before this country's past crises (6), it read higher than in other years 53% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZG) 1961–2025
Consumer prices against a year earlier. Both high inflation and deflation count as the dangerous side.
10.6%
2013
Higher than 78% of years since 1998
Median 9.2% · usual range -1% to 12.2%
The year before past crises: median 4.85%, from -0.9% before the Default and end of convertibility (2001) to 10.6% before the Holdout default (2014)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 2 crises: Holdout default (2014)
Both extremes are dangerous. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (PCPIPCH) 1998–2013
One-year change in the short-term interest rate.
-15.7 pp
2025
Lower than 83% of years since 2011
Danger up from 10 a year ago
Median +3.53 pp · usual range -26.8 pp to +20.7 pp
The year before past crises: median +9.97 pp, from -4.65 pp before the Peso crisis (2018) to +18.7 pp before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 4 crises with data
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FR.INR.LEND) 2010–2025
Three-month money-market rate, or the closest short-term rate available. Both very high and very low count as the dangerous side.
46%
2025
Higher than 66% of years since 2010
Danger down from 69 a year ago
Median 30.3% · usual range 14.1% to 64.5%
The year before past crises: median 39.5%, from 17.2% before the Holdout default (2014) to 67.3% before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 4 crises: Peso crisis (2018)
Both extremes are dangerous. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FR.INR.LEND) 2010–2025
Short-term interest rate minus inflation. Both very high and very low count as the dangerous side.
+6.55 pp
2013
Higher than 88% of years since 2010
Median +4.17 pp · usual range +1.26 pp to +5.87 pp
The year before past crises: median +6.55 pp, from +6.55 pp before the Holdout default (2014) to +6.55 pp before the Holdout default (2014)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 1 crises: Holdout default (2014)
Both extremes are dangerous. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FR.INR.LEND) 2010–2025 · IMF World Economic Outlook (PCPIPCH) 1998–2013
Growth of money and bank deposits over a year.
44.9%
2025
Higher than 55% of years since 1961
Danger down from 52 a year ago
Median 39.5% · usual range 9.26% to 303%
The year before past crises: median 42.3%, from 1.53% before the Default and end of convertibility (2001) to 443% before the Hyperinflation (1989)
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 10 crises with data
Before this country's past crises (6), it read higher than in other years 49% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Both extremes are dangerous. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1984 (655%), 1989 (2,235%), 1990 (1,113%)
Sources: World Bank (FM.LBL.BMNY.ZG) 1961–2025
Five-year change in private credit relative to GDP.
-0.67 pp of GDP
Q4 2025
Lower than 64% of years since 1965
Danger up from 24 a year ago
Median +1.33 pp of GDP · usual range -9.66 pp of GDP to +7.46 pp of GDP
The year before past crises: median +1.98 pp of GDP, from -19.4 pp of GDP before the Tequila contagion (1995) to +20 pp of GDP before the Debt crisis (1982)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 10 crises: Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (6), it read higher than in other years 53% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS) 1960–2025-10
Debt of households, mostly mortgages, relative to GDP.
5.7% of GDP
Q4 2025
Higher than 72% of years since 1994
Danger up from 41 a year ago
Median 4.79% of GDP · usual range 3.52% of GDP to 6.51% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 5.81% of GDP, from 3.93% of GDP before the Tequila contagion (1995) to 7.2% of GDP before the Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 6 crises: Tequila contagion (1995), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 40% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED QARHAM770A 1994–2025-10
Private credit relative to GDP against its long-run trend (one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter, as the BIS computes it).
+3.03 pp of GDP
2017
Higher than 77% of years since 1969
Median +0.54 pp of GDP · usual range -6.87 pp of GDP to +3.61 pp of GDP
The year before past crises: median +2.47 pp of GDP, from -4.11 pp of GDP before the Hyperinflation (1989) to +8.77 pp of GDP before the Debt crisis (1982)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 5 of 8 crises: Rodrigazo (1975), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Peso crisis (2018)
Before this country's past crises (5), it read higher than in other years 66% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS) 1960–2025
Loans to households and firms relative to GDP (bank loans in the history, total credit rescaled to it after).
19.4% of GDP
Q4 2025
Higher than 72% of years since 1960
Danger up from 48 a year ago
Median 15.7% of GDP · usual range 11.2% of GDP to 24.6% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 19.7% of GDP, from 12.9% of GDP before the Inflation surge (2023) to 33.6% of GDP before the Debt crisis (1982)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 5 of 10 crises: Rodrigazo (1975), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (7), it read higher than in other years 73% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS) 1960–2025-10
Debt of non-financial companies relative to GDP.
23.2% of GDP
Q4 2025
Higher than 69% of years since 1994
Danger up from 28 a year ago
Median 21.5% of GDP · usual range 15.6% of GDP to 28.7% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 19.2% of GDP, from 15.8% of GDP before the Peso crisis (2018) to 23.1% of GDP before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 6 of 6 crises: Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 100% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 2002 (73.5% of GDP)
Sources: FRED QARNAM770A 1994–2025-10
Banks’ own capital relative to their assets.
19.7 % of assets
2025
Higher than 93% of years since 2005
Danger up from 2 a year ago
Median 9.44 % of assets · usual range 7.25 % of assets to 18.3 % of assets
The year before past crises: median 10.2 % of assets, from 9.73 % of assets before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020) to 14.7 % of assets before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 4 crises with data
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FB.BNK.CAPA.ZS) 2005–2025
Non-performing loans as a share of all bank loans.
5.29 % of loans
2025
Higher than 93% of years since 2005
Danger up from 17 a year ago
Median 2.73 % of loans · usual range 1.54 % of loans to 5.18 % of loans
The year before past crises: median 2.41 % of loans, from 1.53 % of loans before the Holdout default (2014) to 5.7 % of loans before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 4 crises: Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Inflation surge (2023)
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FB.AST.NPER.ZS) 2005–2025
Bank loans relative to bank deposits.
70.4%
2017
Lower than 80% of years since 1960
Median 92.3% · usual range 64.2% to 150%
The year before past crises: median 92.1%, from 70.4% before the Peso crisis (2018) to 154% before the Debt crisis (1982)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 8 crises: Peso crisis (2018)
Before this country's past crises (6), it read higher than in other years 56% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (GFDD.SI.04) 1960–2017
General government gross debt.
80.1% of GDP
2025
Higher than 66% of years since 1992
Danger down from 78 a year ago
Median 53.5% of GDP · usual range 31% of GDP to 114% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 50.3% of GDP, from 28.4% of GDP before the Tequila contagion (1995) to 89.8% of GDP before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 4 of 6 crises: Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 83% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (GGXWDG_NGDP) 1992–2025
Government revenue minus spending; negative is a deficit.
-0.2% of GDP
2025
Higher than 74% of years since 1993
Danger up from 17 a year ago
Median -2.7% of GDP · usual range -5.88% of GDP to 1.36% of GDP
The year before past crises: median -3.6% of GDP, from -6.7% of GDP before the Peso crisis (2018) to -1.2% of GDP before the Tequila contagion (1995)
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 6 crises with data
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 17% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (GGXCNL_NGDP) 1993–2025
Five-year change in public debt relative to GDP.
-23.7 pp of GDP
2025
Lower than 81% of years since 1997
Danger down from 33 a year ago
Median +10.5 pp of GDP · usual range -41.9 pp of GDP to +70.4 pp of GDP
The year before past crises: median +16.6 pp of GDP, from -10.3 pp of GDP before the Holdout default (2014) to +45.1 pp of GDP before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 5 crises with data
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (GGXWDG_NGDP) 1992–2025
Government interest payments as a share of its spending (World Bank).
7.29 % of spending
2023
Lower than 94% of years since 1990
Median 11.1 % of spending · usual range 7.43 % of spending to 24.7 % of spending
The year before past crises: median 9.42 % of spending, from 7.76 % of spending before the Inflation surge (2023) to 20.1 % of spending before the Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 5 crises with data
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (GC.XPN.INTP.ZS) 1990–2023
Change in the stock market after inflation.
-14.6%
Oct 2026
Lower than 75% of years since 1998
Danger up from 13 a year ago
Median 4.43% · usual range -26.9% to 44.4%
The year before past crises: median 24.4%, from 1.68% before the Default and end of convertibility (2001) to 47.1% before the Holdout default (2014)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 2 of 2 crises: Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014)
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: yahoo:^MERV 1997–2026-10 · IMF World Economic Outlook (PCPIPCH) 1998–2013
Real stock prices against their average of the previous ten years.
417%
Dec 2016
Higher than 100% of years since 2005
Median 45.9% · usual range 5.69% to 76.3%
The year before past crises: median 37%, from 37% before the Holdout default (2014) to 37% before the Holdout default (2014)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 1 crises: Holdout default (2014)
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: yahoo:^MERV 1997–2016-12 · IMF World Economic Outlook (PCPIPCH) 1998–2013
Annualized variation of the monthly stock index (monthly data only).
30.2%
Oct 2026
Lower than 60% of years since 1997
Danger down from 97 a year ago
Median 32.8% · usual range 23.7% to 64.3%
The year before past crises: median 36.1%, from 18.8% before the Peso crisis (2018) to 73.2% before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 2 of 5 crises: Default and end of convertibility (2001), Peso crisis (2018)
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: yahoo:^MERV 1997–2026-10
Real stock prices below their highest level of the previous five years.
-13.8%
Oct 2026
Lower than 53% of years since 1997
Danger up from 24 a year ago
Median -6.89% · usual range -40.6% to 0%
The year before past crises: median -16.3%, from -32.6% before the Default and end of convertibility (2001) to 0% before the Holdout default (2014)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 2 crises: Holdout default (2014)
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: yahoo:^MERV 1997–2026-10 · IMF World Economic Outlook (PCPIPCH) 1998–2013
Value of listed companies relative to GDP (World Bank).
8.35% of GDP
2022
Lower than 62% of years since 1977
Median 9.53% of GDP · usual range 1.48% of GDP to 20% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 8.8% of GDP, from 1.77% of GDP before the Debt crisis (1982) to 16.9% of GDP before the Peso crisis (2018)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 4 of 9 crises: Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (4), it read higher than in other years 24% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS) 1977–2022
Balance of trade, income and transfers with the rest of the world; negative is a deficit.
-1.14% of GDP
2025
Higher than 53% of years since 1976
Danger up from 27 a year ago
Median -1.32% of GDP · usual range -4.32% of GDP to 2.23% of GDP
The year before past crises: median -2.38% of GDP, from -5.99% of GDP before the Debt crisis (1982) to -0.63% of GDP before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 9 crises: Banking crisis of 1980-82, Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (4), it read higher than in other years 72% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS) 1976–2025
Change in the price of a US dollar in local currency: positive means the currency weakened.
5.37%
Sep 2026
Lower than 64% of years since 1964
Danger down from 60 a year ago
Median 20.6% · usual range 0% to 308%
The year before past crises: median 28.9%, from 0% before the Rodrigazo (1975) to 308% before the Hyperinflation (1989)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 10 crises: Rodrigazo (1975), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Before this country's past crises (6), it read higher than in other years 65% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1975 (632%), 1982 (489%), 1984 (542%), 1985 (790%), 1989 (4,737%), 1990 (1,052%)
Sources: World Bank (PA.NUS.FCRF) 1963–2026-09
Real effective exchange rate (BIS) against its 10-year average.
18.7%
Jul 2026
Higher than 100% of years since 2002
Danger up from 96 a year ago
Median -31.1% · usual range -45% to -0.41%
The year before past crises: median -19.1%, from -36.1% before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020) to -4.52% before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 4 of 4 crises: Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED RBARBIS 1994–2026-07
Central bank reserves measured in months of imports.
4.03 months of imports
2025
Lower than 79% of years since 1976
Danger down from 85 a year ago
Median 5.6 months of imports · usual range 3.45 months of imports to 7.37 months of imports
The year before past crises: median 5.6 months of imports, from 3.46 months of imports before the Holdout default (2014) to 13.3 months of imports before the Banking crisis of 1980-82
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 7 of 9 crises: Banking crisis of 1980-82, Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (4), it read higher than in other years 71% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (FI.RES.TOTL.MO) 1976–2025
Net inflows of foreign direct investment relative to GDP.
0.64% of GDP
2025
Lower than 70% of years since 1970
Danger up from 35 a year ago
Median 1.3% of GDP · usual range 0.22% of GDP to 2.68% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 1.45% of GDP, from 0.02% of GDP before the Rodrigazo (1975) to 3.67% of GDP before the Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 8 of 10 crises: Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (5), it read higher than in other years 56% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS) 1970–2025
How hostile supporters of opposing political camps are to each other (V-Dem experts; 0 = friendly, 4 = generally hostile).
3.67 of 4
2025
Higher than 70% of years since 1900
Danger about the same as a year ago (70)
Median 3.1 of 4 · usual range 2.19 of 4 to 3.76 of 4
The year before past crises: median 3.67 of 4, from 1.99 of 4 before the Hyperinflation (1989) to 3.76 of 4 before the Rodrigazo (1975)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 9 of 12 crises: War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (9), it read higher than in other years 34% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1900–2025
How frequent and large demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins were (V-Dem; 0 = virtually none, 4 = many large-scale).
3.84 of 4
2025
Higher than 98% of years since 1900
Danger about the same as a year ago (97)
Median 2.64 of 4 · usual range 1.89 of 4 to 3.56 of 4
The year before past crises: median 3.03 of 4, from 0.71 of 4 before the Banking crisis of 1980-82 to 3.51 of 4 before the Holdout default (2014)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 12 of 12 crises: War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (9), it read higher than in other years 40% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1900–2025
How often non-state actors used violence for political ends (V-Dem; 0 = not at all, 4 = often).
0.48 of 4
2025
Lower than 100% of years since 1900
Danger down from 31 a year ago
Median 2.33 of 4 · usual range 0.87 of 4 to 3.63 of 4
The year before past crises: median 1.32 of 4, from 0.83 of 4 before the Hyperinflation (1989) to 3.7 of 4 before the Banking crisis of 1980-82
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 12 crises with data
Before this country's past crises (9), it read higher than in other years 36% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1900–2025
Strength of movements that want to change the political system fundamentally (V-Dem; 0 = practically none, 4 = very strong).
0.63 of 4
2025
Lower than 68% of years since 1850
Danger about the same as a year ago (32)
Median 0.85 of 4 · usual range 0.28 of 4 to 1.89 of 4
The year before past crises: median 0.77 of 4, from 0.11 of 4 before the Tequila contagion (1995) to 1.98 of 4 before the Rodrigazo (1975)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 6 of 13 crises: Great Depression (1929), Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014)
Before this country's past crises (11), it read higher than in other years 48% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
Strength of anti-system movements times the share of experts calling them separatist or autonomist (V-Dem).
0 of 4
2025
Higher than 50% of years since 1850
Danger about the same as a year ago (50)
Median 0 of 4 · usual range 0 of 4 to 0 of 4
The year before past crises: median 0 of 4, from 0 of 4 before the Baring crisis (1890) to 0 of 4 before the Baring crisis (1890)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 13 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (11), it read higher than in other years 50% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
Five-year change in the V-Dem liberal democracy index (0-100); negative means it fell.
-11 points
2025
Lower than 91% of years since 1855
Danger up from 87 a year ago
Median +0.3 points · usual range -9.6 points to +8.7 points
The year before past crises: median +2.3 points, from -27.5 points before the Banking crisis of 1980-82 to +46.6 points before the Hyperinflation (1989)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 12 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (11), it read higher than in other years 37% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1931 (-25.8 points), 1961 (+25.7 points), 1969 (-33.9 points), 1970 (-33.5 points), 1978 (-23 points), 1979 (-27.5 points), 1980 (-23.9 points), 1984 (+62.7 points), 1985 (+62.3 points), 1986 (+62.1 points), 1987 (+62.1 points), 1988 (+46.6 points)
Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
How often "uncertainty" appears in country reports (World Uncertainty Index; Economic Policy Uncertainty for the euro area).
0.48
Q2 2026
Higher than 96% of years since 1952
Danger up from 80 a year ago
Median 0.16 · usual range 0.04 to 0.4
The year before past crises: median 0.18, from 0.05 before the Debt crisis (1982) to 0.41 before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 10 of 10 crises: Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (8), it read higher than in other years 44% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED WUIARG 1952–2026-04
Unemployment rate plus inflation.
17.7%
2013
Higher than 53% of years since 1998
Median 17.5% · usual range 15.4% to 26%
The year before past crises: median 17%, from 16.2% before the Default and end of convertibility (2001) to 17.7% before the Holdout default (2014)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 2 of 2 crises: Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014)
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 2002 (48.4%), 2003 (30.7%)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (LUR) 1980–2025 · IMF World Economic Outlook (PCPIPCH) 1998–2013
Share of national income before taxes going to the richest 1% (World Inequality Database, with its estimates for gaps).
18.1%
2024
Higher than 68% of years since 1850
Danger about the same as a year ago (68)
Median 14.9% · usual range 12.6% to 20.7%
The year before past crises: median 14.8%, from 11.2% before the Holdout default (2014) to 14.9% before the Debt crisis (1982)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 8 of 8 crises: Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (6), it read higher than in other years 62% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Inequality Database via Our World in Data 1850–2024
How much of the economy the state owns or directly controls (V-Dem; 0 = very little, 4 = virtually all).
0.98 of 4
2025
Higher than 63% of years since 1850
Median 0.58 of 4 · usual range 0.32 of 4 to 1.6 of 4
The year before past crises: median 1.18 of 4, from 0.32 of 4 before the Baring crisis (1890) to 1.66 of 4 before the Rodrigazo (1975)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 5 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Shown for context; not part of the score. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
Size of the state: government spending relative to GDP. The long-run series cover central government only, so the level is lower than the familiar general-government figure.
31% of GDP
2024
Higher than 90% of years since 1864
Median 10.6% of GDP · usual range 6.72% of GDP to 30.8% of GDP
The year before past crises: median 14.5% of GDP, from 7.47% of GDP before the War crisis of 1914 to 41.1% of GDP before the Peso crisis (2018)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 9 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Shown for context; not part of the score. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 2012 (36.8% of GDP), 2013 (37.6% of GDP), 2014 (38.9% of GDP), 2015 (41.4% of GDP), 2016 (41.5% of GDP), 2017 (41.1% of GDP), 2018 (39% of GDP), 2019 (38.1% of GDP), 2020 (42.5% of GDP), 2021 (37.9% of GDP), 2022 (37.6% of GDP), 2023 (37.6% of GDP)
Sources: IMF Public Finances in Modern History 1864–2024
Strength of anti-system movements times the share of experts calling them leftist, socialist or communist (V-Dem).
0.25 of 4
2025
Higher than 58% of years since 1850
Median 0.12 of 4 · usual range 0 of 4 to 0.48 of 4
The year before past crises: median 0.31 of 4, from 0 of 4 before the Great Depression (1929) to 0.62 of 4 before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 6 of 13 crises: Great Depression (1929), Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014)
Shown for context; not part of the score. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
Strength of anti-system movements times the share of experts calling them rightist or "party of order" (V-Dem).
0.38 of 4
2025
Higher than 95% of years since 1850
Median 0 of 4 · usual range 0 of 4 to 0.09 of 4
The year before past crises: median 0 of 4, from 0 of 4 before the Baring crisis (1890) to 0.66 of 4 before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 10 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018)
Shown for context; not part of the score. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
V-Dem political corruption index (0 = none, 100 = pervasive).
41.5 of 100
2025
Higher than 67% of years since 1850
Danger up from 62 a year ago
Median 30.9 of 100 · usual range 24.4 of 100 to 55.1 of 100
The year before past crises: median 42.3 of 100, from 22.1 of 100 before the Great Depression (1929) to 61.1 of 100 before the Tequila contagion (1995)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 6 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Hyperinflation (1989), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Before this country's past crises (11), it read higher than in other years 57% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
Five-year change in the V-Dem rule-of-law index (0-100).
-5.2 points
2025
Lower than 77% of years since 1855
Danger up from 73 a year ago
Median 0 points · usual range -19.5 points to +15.1 points
The year before past crises: median +0.1 points, from -21.8 points before the Banking crisis of 1980-82 to +31.6 points before the Hyperinflation (1989)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 10 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Before this country's past crises (11), it read higher than in other years 45% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1959 (+39.2 points), 1960 (+41.9 points), 1967 (-36.9 points), 1968 (-48.4 points), 1969 (-54.3 points), 1970 (-49.1 points), 1983 (+37.6 points), 1984 (+69.2 points), 1985 (+68.6 points), 1986 (+68.6 points), 1987 (+68.6 points), 1990 (-37.6 points), 1991 (-34.2 points)
Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
Five-year change in the V-Dem freedom of expression and alternative information index (0-100).
-14.2 points
2025
Lower than 87% of years since 1855
Danger about the same as a year ago (85)
Median 0 points · usual range -24 points to +26.7 points
The year before past crises: median 0 points, from -63.4 points before the Banking crisis of 1980-82 to +58.5 points before the Hyperinflation (1989)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 12 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (11), it read higher than in other years 42% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Low values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1931 (-51.9 points), 1932 (-46.8 points), 1936 (+29.6 points), 1943 (-29.5 points), 1944 (-37.3 points), 1945 (-39.2 points), 1946 (-32.4 points), 1947 (-31.6 points), 1958 (+45.9 points), 1959 (+58.4 points), 1960 (+52 points), 1961 (+37.5 points), 1967 (-43.1 points), 1968 (-49.7 points), 1969 (-50.2 points), 1970 (-49.1 points), 1974 (+37.5 points), 1976 (-29.4 points), 1977 (-43.8 points), 1978 (-52.7 points), 1979 (-63.4 points), 1980 (-56 points), 1983 (+32.8 points), 1984 (+91.3 points), 1985 (+91.3 points), 1986 (+91.3 points), 1987 (+90.6 points), 1988 (+58.5 points)
Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
How much the government represses civil society organizations (V-Dem; 0 = none, 4 = severely).
1.44 of 4
2025
Higher than 63% of years since 1850
Danger up from 41 a year ago
Median 1.25 of 4 · usual range 0.18 of 4 to 2.78 of 4
The year before past crises: median 0.82 of 4, from 0.18 of 4 before the Hyperinflation (1989) to 3.71 of 4 before the Banking crisis of 1980-82
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 10 of 13 crises: Baring crisis (1890), War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (11), it read higher than in other years 37% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1850–2025
Coup attempts in the year (Powell & Thyne, via V-Dem).
0
2024
Lower than 54% of years since 1950
Danger about the same as a year ago (46)
Median 0 · usual range 0 to 0
The year before past crises: median 0, from 0 before the Rodrigazo (1975) to 0 before the Rodrigazo (1975)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 10 of 10 crises: Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (8), it read higher than in other years 49% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: V-Dem 1950–2024
Deaths in armed conflicts the country is involved in (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, via Our World in Data).
0
2026
Lower than 55% of years since 1989
Danger down from 93 a year ago
Median 0 · usual range 0 to 7.8
The year before past crises: median 0, from 0 before the Default and end of convertibility (2001) to 138 before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 4 of 6 crises: Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 93% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Inequality Database via Our World in Data 1989–2026
Share of newspaper articles about wars, terrorism and tensions involving the country, since 1900 (Caldara & Iacoviello).
0.03 % of articles
Sep 2026
Lower than 70% of years since 1900
Danger up from 0 a year ago
Median 0.04 % of articles · usual range 0.02 % of articles to 0.13 % of articles
The year before past crises: median 0.04 % of articles, from 0.01 % of articles before the Peso crisis (2018) to 0.09 % of articles before the Rodrigazo (1975)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 12 crises: Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018)
Before this country's past crises (9), it read higher than in other years 35% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1982 (0.66 % of articles)
Sources: Geopolitical Risk index (Caldara & Iacoviello) 1900–2026-09
Unemployment of 15-24-year-olds (ILO estimates via the World Bank).
19.2%
2025
Lower than 76% of years since 1991
Danger down from 27 a year ago
Median 22.8% · usual range 18.5% to 35.4%
The year before past crises: median 24.3%, from 19% before the Inflation surge (2023) to 32.4% before the Default and end of convertibility (2001)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 1 of 6 crises: Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 67% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (SL.UEM.1524.ZS) 1991–2025
People aged 65 and over per 100 people of working age.
19 per 100 workers
2025
Higher than 99% of years since 1960
Median 14.6 per 100 workers · usual range 9.75 per 100 workers to 18 per 100 workers
The year before past crises: median 15.2 per 100 workers, from 11.2 per 100 workers before the Rodrigazo (1975) to 18.5 per 100 workers before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 10 of 10 crises: Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Shown for context; not part of the score. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: World Bank (SP.POP.DPND.OL) 1960–2025
Crude oil price (WTI) against a year earlier. Both sharp rises and falls count as the dangerous side.
52.1%
Sep 2026
Higher than 95% of years since 1947
Danger up from 65 a year ago
Median 0.57% · usual range -14.5% to 36.5%
The year before past crises: median 11%, from -16.7% before the Hyperinflation (1989) to 168% before the Rodrigazo (1975)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 8 of 10 crises: Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (8), it read higher than in other years 59% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Both extremes are dangerous. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1974 (168%)
Sources: FRED WTISPLC 1946–2026-09
The US dollar against major currencies, against a year earlier.
-0.68%
Sep 2026
Lower than 77% of years since 1974
Danger about the same as a year ago (23)
Median 2.79% · usual range -4.52% to 11%
The year before past crises: median 2.84%, from -0.28% before the Peso crisis (2018) to 11% before the Debt crisis (1982)
Today is less extreme than the year before every one of the 10 crises with data
Before this country's past crises (5), it read higher than in other years 60% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED TWEXBMTH 1973–2019 · FRED DTWEXBGS 2020–2026-09
Expected stock market volatility implied by S&P 500 option prices (VIX).
15.8
Sep 2026
Lower than 67% of years since 1990
Danger about the same as a year ago (33)
Median 17.6 · usual range 12.8 to 26.6
The year before past crises: median 14.8, from 11.1 before the Peso crisis (2018) to 25.6 before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 4 of 6 crises: Tequila contagion (1995), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 21% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED VIXCLS 1990–2026-09
IMF index of all commodity prices against a year earlier.
16.6%
Jul 2026
Higher than 70% of years since 1993
Danger up from 9 a year ago
Median 1.46% · usual range -11.8% to 25.8%
The year before past crises: median 8.73%, from -8.38% before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020) to 33.7% before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 3 of 6 crises: Tequila contagion (1995), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 17% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
Both extremes are dangerous. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED PALLFNFINDEXM 1992–2026-07
IMF food price index against a year earlier.
4.78%
Jul 2026
Higher than 64% of years since 1993
Danger up from 27 a year ago
Median 1.47% · usual range -8.32% to 14.7%
The year before past crises: median 1.57%, from -3.06% before the Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020) to 14.8% before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 5 of 6 crises: Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
Before this country's past crises (3), it read higher than in other years 100% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED PFOODINDEXM 1992–2026-07
Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index (GDP-weighted, Baker, Bloom & Davis).
242
Jul 2026
Higher than 90% of years since 1997
Danger down from 100 a year ago
Median 121 · usual range 71.4 to 239
The year before past crises: median 171, from 74.9 before the Default and end of convertibility (2001) to 254 before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 4 of 5 crises: Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020)
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Sources: FRED GEPUCURRENT 1997–2026-07
News coverage of wars, terrorism and international tensions since 1900 (Caldara & Iacoviello; 100 = the 1985-2019 average).
137
Sep 2026
Higher than 88% of years since 1900
Danger up from 80 a year ago
Median 86.3 · usual range 45.1 to 161
The year before past crises: median 71.7, from 37.2 before the Great Depression (1929) to 113 before the Inflation surge (2023)
Today is at least as extreme as the year before 12 of 12 crises: War crisis of 1914, Great Depression (1929), Rodrigazo (1975), Banking crisis of 1980-82, Debt crisis (1982), Hyperinflation (1989), Tequila contagion (1995), Default and end of convertibility (2001), Holdout default (2014), Peso crisis (2018), Ninth default and COVID-19 (2020), Inflation surge (2023)
Before this country's past crises (9), it read higher than in other years 19% of the time; 50% is what chance would give.
High values are the dangerous side. Shaded: past crises (hover for their names); dashed: median.Off the chart: 1915 (270), 1916 (260), 1917 (297), 1918 (332), 1942 (306), 1943 (344), 1944 (377)
Sources: Geopolitical Risk index (Caldara & Iacoviello) 1900–2026-09
Inflation passed 200%; the new government devalued the peso by half.
Another default and restructuring, then a 10% fall in output.
The peso halved and Argentina took the IMF’s largest-ever loan, $57 billion.
A US court ruling put Argentina into selective default.
Deposits were frozen (corralito), the peso lost three quarters and Argentina defaulted on $95 billion.
The Mexican crisis set off a run that cost the banks a fifth of their deposits.
Prices rose about 3,000% in 1989; the Convertibility plan followed in 1991.
Argentina defaulted as the Latin American debt crisis spread.
The collapse of the tablita exchange-rate plan brought down dozens of banks.
A huge devaluation and price shock set off inflation above 300%.
Exports collapsed and a military coup ended constitutional rule in 1930.
Capital stopped flowing in at the outbreak of World War I; banks failed.
Argentina could not service its debt; banks failed and Barings in London nearly collapsed.